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Abstract 
It is no exaggeration to say that the events sweeping the Arab World in the past 
year have gripped us all and I guess a lot of us (myself included) are still trying to 
grapple with their implications. Yet, at this stage I think it is better to exercise 
caution before coming to any definitive conclusions about post-uprising politics. 
For no other reason than there are few guarantees during a transitional phase. 
Drawing on lessons from the field of democratization studies, the following article 
argues that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region faces some major 
obstacles in what will be difficult times ahead for its post-authoritarian political 
reform. 
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Introduction 
We can all too readily assume that when countries enter transitions from 
authoritarian rule they are inextricably moving towards democracy. This is 
a false assumption. Let us not fool ourselves the challenges of transition 
confronting the Arab Spring are multiple. They will involve addressing 
transitional justice, effective political reform and economic stabilization 
while negotiating the pitfalls of complex local terrains. This encompasses a 
daunting catalogue of associated concerns including popular legitimation, 
judicial reform, diffusing democratic values, marginalizing anti-system 
actors, ensuring greater civilian rule over the military, removal of reserved 
authoritarian domains, party-system development and the routinization of 
politics (Schedler 1998). If our experience of democratization phenomena 
tells us anything, it is that countries will not emerge overnight from such a 
process. It may be one thing to establish formal democratic institutions, but 
quite another to sustain them over time without stagnation or reversal. In 
recent years, numerous scholars have drawn our attention to the 
emergence of what are more commonly referred to as ’hybrid regimes’ 
(Casper 1995; Hadiz 2004; McFaul 2002; Zakaria 1997). Neither one thing 
nor the other, these types of regime outwardly display some of the formal 
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procedural features of ‘democracy’ but they ‘play’ by considerably different 
‘rules’. From Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea Basin to 
Cambodia in Southeast Asia and Nigeria in West Africa, transitions from 
authoritarian rule to effective multi-party democracy are anything but easy. 
  
We need to be clear here, democratization is not the same as democracy. 
There is a crucial distinction between the political system (democracy) and 
the process of establishing that system (democratization). The latter is very 
much a process and rarely, if ever, ideal. This seems to rest on the fact that 
during a transition period, past developmental patterns and underlying 
societal conventions can constrain the preferences and policy capacities of 
political actors enacting change. Often times, it is perceived self-interests or 
those of ‘reserved domains’ that end up playing significant roles in shaping 
events and outcomes. Distinct trade-offs arise in no small part because 
change involves compromise with an authoritarian past (Bermeo 1990; Karl 
1990). Whilst not wanting to sound too pessimistic, this reality can 
constrain even the best of intentions. In other words, the legacies of the past 
make democratic re-arrangement vis-à-vis political power a complicated 
affair.  
 
In our current situation, distinct conditioning factors will no doubt affect 
different countries in different ways in the MENA. External reactionary 
forces will also certainly exert a stronger pull in some cases rather than 
others. Nevertheless, if the ‘Arab Spring’ is to bring about lasting change 
for the better then thinking about what has actually worked in other places 
may be a place to start. 
 
Running free and fair elections 
Firstly, there is the organization of free and fair elections to contend with in 
circumstances of flux and instability. A word of warning here, there is little 
point in assuming that elections in isolation will simply channel contests 
among political rivals and accord public legitimacy. There also has to be 
correspondent reform of state institutions, policymaking procedures and 
attendant recovery of civil liberties and political rights (enhanced freedom 
of expression, access to alternative information, and expansion of 
associational autonomy). The lifting of press restrictions, releasing political 
prisoners, and removing restrictions on the formation of new political 
parties will all contribute positively to a reform friendly climate.  
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Getting the Military back in the barracks 
Secondly, dismantling the most repressive structures of an authoritarian 
regime and removing the military gradually from politics are also major 
tasks of reform (McCulloch 2003). In regards to the events unfolding in the 
MENA, this means reigning in the excessive arbitrary power and nefarious 
practices of the internal security services, aka Mukhabarat. Now pragmatism 
and a distinct fear of further grass-root insurrection may eventually force 
this issue but a word to the wise doing it while public demand is strong is a 
good idea for future legitimacy. The protesters have broken through a fear 
barrier and are no longer cowed by threats either psychological or physical. 
Political leaders should, therefore, move quickly to separate the police from 
the military.  
 
Of course, having the military onside will be essential especially in former 
autocracies like Tunisia and Egypt. Turning them in to an asset rather than 
a threat to the process is going to be a challenge right enough but not 
insurmountable. If the military are to be persuaded to ‘return to the 
barracks’ this will involve investment in their professionalism (which will 
cost money) and appeals to their sense of honour. They have to realize that 
their job is to ensure stability by upholding the constitutionally mandated 
institutions of public interest.  
 
To prevent a reactionary backlash, allowing the military to retain 
substantial economic interests is a prudent move if a difficult pill to 
swallow (in the short term at least). However, a word of warning here, this 
cannot just be some sort of perverse exchange between essentially status 
quo forces. We must be exceptionally wary of ‘grand bargains’ being struck 
whereby political hegemony is transferred on the assurance that the 
military unconditionally retains its reserved economic domains and 
privileged status. Rather, it must be with the intention of creating enough 
time and space to actually institute some step by step reforms, the aim 
being to phase out gradually military embeddedness in the body politic. 
Overtime, the latter approach can bring about improved civilian rule over 
the military.  
 
Transitional Justice? 
This can then feed in to considerations about transitional justice and what 
form that might take and the steps needed to achieve it.  Some key issues to 
resolve are who will be brought to justice for past crimes, and how far back 
into the past that justice process should reach. It is an incredibly fraught 
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and thorny process but often times a society needs to allow some of its 
“open wounds” to heal so that it can move on. One way to do this is to give 
them a good ‘airing’. This may involve the establishment of some form of 
truth and reconciliation commission as seen in places like South Africa or 
East Timor, depending on circumstance.  
 
Given the atrocities taking place in Syria, if the Assad regime falls then 
some sort of commission would seem almost inevitable for a meaningful 
and stable future in that country The scale of the regime’s atrocitities and 
the country’s cross-cutting sectarian rivalries make the potential for wide-
scale retribution and blood-letting a very real prospect. Moreover, the 
commanders heading up the paramilitary Shabiha units in Syria who are 
carrying out some of the worst atrocities against the populace should be 
pursued with the same tenacity by the international community as similar 
such figures  have been in the former Yugoslavia. Future prosecutions at 
the ICC are a very real possibility for the worst offenders of the Syrian 
regime. Such steps are important in post conflict situations as they provide 
mortar to rebuild respect for state institutions and the rule of law. Restoring 
pride and trust in institutions such as the judiciary, law enforcement and 
security services is a massive task of reform that will take time and 
substantial effort. The fight against endemic corruption, cronyism, and 
nepotism must not be overlooked as it is also a vital component in restoring 
pride and trust. This involves setting up some sort of corruption 
eradication commission as a necessary first step in making inroads. 
 
Making Constitutional Reforms 
Thirdly, enacting major constitutional reform and some form of 
decentralization of overly centralized political power structures is also 
crucial in laying solid foundations for democratic legitimacy and effective 
representation. Restructuring existing assemblies or introducing new 
regional bodies can improve representation and accountability, albeit by 
degrees. As the process unfolds successive elections will act as litmus tests 
for progress made. We should get clearer indications as to whether there 
are a meaningful and extensive number of permitted political parties. We 
will be able to see whether election rules have stabilized and whether 
constitutional limitations on the power of the executive are providing an 
effective check to facilitate peaceful civilian transfers of power. This may 
involve having a president elected directly and only serving one renewable 
five-year term. It is also important that newly emerging legislatures are 
mandated constitutionally with enough authority to amend, or veto 
legislation, which will encourage any new president to maintain broad 
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support in the legislature. The extent to which media in a country remains 
open and vigorous and whether civil society activity (NGOs and pressure 
groups) continues to flourish will also provide a barometer for successive 
elections and whether a routinization of politics is taking place. Most 
important for ensuring all of this will be the ongoing acceptance of a more 
democratic framework of political contestation around new ‘rules of the 
game’.   
 
Countering concerns about radical Islamist ascendancy 
Fourthly, a major concern for future developments in the Arab world is the 
spectre of radical Islamist ascendancy. Any attempts to coercively curb an 
emergent Islamism are sensitive political issues in this part of the world. In 
the past, many militant groups in the Middle East have prospered off the 
deficiencies of autocrats by stepping in where the regimes had so abjectly 
failed, namely the provision of education, health and sanitation for the 
poorest in society. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salifist movement are 
prime examples in Egypt. Overt military/police intrusion will not play well 
domestically. Impinging on newly acquired democratic freedoms of 
moderate Islamic majorities runs the risk of antagonizing or polarizing 
segments of the populaces. A more assertive political Islam willing to 
challenge corrupt practices is probably no bad thing. It will certainly 
introduce much needed electoral competition into the party-system. This 
means that former regime acolytes must pay closer attention to their own 
deficiencies and seek to improve their performance if they are to keep their 
pro-Islamic factions and constituencies onside. Despite the recent electoral 
success of Islamist parties in both Tunisia and Egypt, the tenor of the 
uprisings, nevertheless, suggest people there will expect them to respect 
the rule of law and seek to address economic and corruption problems 
within the framework of a constitutional parliamentary nation-state. In 
short, they will have to perform and operate (and consequently be 
contained) within the electoral rules of democratic contestation and 
procedure. In fact, if they do not and move towards coercively instituting a 
form of Islamist theocracy they may well be met with more popular 
uprisings.  
 
Translating frustrations into representation and reform 
Clearly, there are no guarantees during a transition but commitment to 
step-by-step reforms and increased contestation can bring compromise, 
progress and acceptance. The real issue for the MENA is not whether it will 
be secular or Islamic. In many ways, this is a false dichotomy and 
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distraction from much greater concerns. What we have and are witnessing 
in the region is a simultaneous convergence of multiple social, economic 
and political vectors bringing things into sharp relief. Overwhelmingly, it is 
the failures of corrupt, repressive and ossified autocratic regimes that have 
come home to roost. If we look at the conditions in these countries, there 
are some pretty clear clues to the storms that were brewing. We all know 
that there was and are massive inequalities in wealth distribution. Despite 
substantial wealth generation that narrow self-serving politico-business-
military elites enjoyed some of which trickled down to the middle classes, 
economic stagnation was and is rife. Combine this with rising prices of 
basic foodstuffs and high unemployment amongst educated, tech savvy but 
disenfranchised sections of youthful populaces and you have an extremely 
volatile mix.  
 
Events in Tunisia simply provided the catalytic stimulus to set in train a 
cathartic outpouring of wider frustrations few anticipated but not all were 
surprised at when things finally erupted. One of the most fascinating 
aspects of the Arab Spring has been the cross-cutting nature of these 
popular uprisings (traversing race, gender, religion and social status). The 
speed with which ‘horizontal bonds of solidarity’ were formed between 
mostly student led activist groups and the wider populaces is a new 
phenomenon facilitated logistically by social media technology. For 
instance, the momentum for change that ultimately pushed Mubarak out 
took inspiration from the Kefaya (Enough) and April 6th movements, the 
latter originating in 2008 as an expression of solidarity with striking 
workers in Al-Mahala. Interestingly, the April 6th movement had itself been 
in contact with a Serbian group called Otpor (the student led movement 
that helped bring down Slobodan Milosevic in 2000). They obviously 
provided helpful input on tactics and strategies. This can be seen in the 
actions of protesters with their strategies reflecting the thinking of Gene 
Sharp and Gandhian principles about speaking truth to the regimes and 
remaining resolute in the face of reprisals (Sharp 1985). All of which echo 
Henry David Thoreau’s counsel, “All men recognize the right of revolution; 
that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when 
its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable” (Thoreau 2008 
[1849]). What the people of the region now have to do is find ways to strike 
a different ‘social contract’ by translating the popular social momentum for 
greater political freedoms, effective rule of law and better living conditions 
(that brought down their autocrats) into representative capacity.  
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This means establishing political competition and relevant political forces 
learning how to operate within the new ‘rules of the game’ if they are to 
have influence. As pro-Islamic political players begin to establish 
themselves in their respective party systems, there is no reason to assume 
that democratic development in Arab world will necessarily reflect western 
norms. What emerges might not meet a western liberal definition of 
democracy. But, from India to Japan, if experience teaches us anything, 
they do not need to and will be no less a democracy for that, if that is 
indeed what eventuates. There is no one-size-fits-all definition of 
democracy rather many variations. As we are already witnessing, Islamic 
political parties will no doubt represent an important and necessary part of 
democratic evolution in the MENA region just as Christian democratic 
parties did in Europe, whatever that may hold. 
 
The Outlook 
Please do not think I am being overly optimistic here, I am not. One need 
only look at the tragedy unfolding in Syria to get a grim reminder of the 
limits of liberal interventionism and the odious brutality of authoritarian 
regimes. Especially when you have a despot desperate to cling to power 
shored up by the geostrategic interests of powerful international actors, 
namely Russia, Iran and to a lesser extent China. Having said this, we 
should not forget the multiple ways in which the international community 
can still effectively intervene in the internal affairs of Syria (economic, 
diplomatic, overt and covert assistance) that falls short of a UN Security 
Council resolution on military intervention. After all, genuinely liberal 
forms of intervention are those that help people help themselves to be free 
and often fall well short of the use of armed force. If armed intervention 
does eventuate, the international community’s responsibility to protect 
needs to be guided by some basic criteria, namely it is the option of last 
resort. There must be the right authority and intention. Proportional means 
should be utitlised and lastly, there has to be reasonable prospects of 
success (difficult to judge and achieve in a place like Syria). Any such 
escalation in conflict threatens to spill over into neighbouring Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan with serious consequences for regional stability that 
will heighten tensions and security concerns in Israel. 
 
From a democratization perspective, leaving Syria aside for a moment as it 
is some way short of being at the same stage as other ‘uprising’ countries, 
the present moment in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen is now a transition 
period. An entrance into uncertainty characterized by opportunity but also 
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fraught with danger. While there is no denying the significance of their 
uprisings, an unfettered triumphalism is premature at this stage. The 
process is as susceptible to stall, breakdown or retreat back into what 
Marina Ottoway has termed a ‘semi-authoritarian condition’ (Ottoway 
2003).  
 
The ousting of Ben Ali, Mubarak et al is a sign of encouragement, a first 
profound step yes but just a beginning, an opening. The real work and the 
real difficulties start after the downfalls. To come through such a process 
and establish a democracy as the “only game in town”, change has to occur 
incrementally on the behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional levels. 
There will be no simple categorizations, rather matters of time and degree. 
After all, a successful democratization is really about acceptance. That is to 
say, relevant political forces have to work out how best to continue to 
submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of democratic 
institutions (Przeworski 1991). This takes time, commitment, vigilance and 
no small amount of good fortune (prudens qui patiens).   
 
Currently, the new rules of the political game are not yet defined and very 
much in flux. They will be and are being fiercely contested. What is already 
becoming patently clear is that the organizational structures of the old 
regimes in these countries have not just vanished and their legacies will not 
simply disappear. Take Egypt as an example, there is strong residual 
presence that continues to constrain reform even as the old institutional 
structures unravel. We can expect and are already witnessing ‘old’ actors 
contesting for power as they try to stage a return to the political arena in 
different ways (Collier and Collier 1991). Egyptians scornfully call them 
‘fuloul’ (a remnant). Ex-prime-minster under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafiq 
running for the Egyptian presidency and a recent constitutional court 
ruling disbanding the newly elected parliament are clear cases in point. 
Despite the recent election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi as 
the new president, the constitutional court’s decision essentially green 
lights SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) to make an audacious 
power grab as it still holds a constitutional remit on legislative and 
executive power. SCAF blatantly tried to polarize the electorate to their 
advantage and set up a 'Hobson's choice' for presidential election. What is 
becoming clearer is that the mainly progressive forces that fueled the 
Egyptian uprising especially in Tahrir Square have just not had sufficient 
time or resources to capacity build against powerful and organized 
reactionary actors. Having said this, if SCAF continue to 'smoke and mirror' 
this process like the bad old days I think we are going to see further 
euroPOLIS vol. 6, no.1/2012 
 
39 
 
protests in the coming year. From personal correspondence, I get the 
feeling the Egyptian people are not buying SCAF's illusion of change while 
nothing really changes. 
 
It is, therefore, of more importance for countries like Tunisia and Egypt to 
focus on the slow and difficult process of diminishing power asymmetries 
by constitutionally de-coupling the corrupt and corrupting nexus between 
politics, business and the military. It will require courage on all sides. 
Leaders of emerging oppositions will need to negotiate with regime 
moderates and seize the opportunity provided by the uprisings to push 
hard for concessions from disoriented regimes. From the machinations in 
Egypt, we can see how difficult and arduous this process is going to be. But 
keeping them honest, as Australians would say, is bolstered by the fact that 
popular attitudes are well tempered by strong doses of mistrust towards 
established political circles.  
 
The international community must also be careful not to deprive these 
events of their most powerful aspect. They are mass popular uprisings 
against repressive rule. Ones that have directly contradicted the hegemonic 
narratives long spun by these regimes that their secular strongmen were 
both the guarantors of stability and the only bulwark against a fanatical 
Islamist takeover. Resulting outcomes could be transformative in their 
impact on a regional order that has, for decades, elevated regime stability 
and western interests above the democratic and participatory desires of its 
inhabitants. If given the chance and the right sort of international support 
and conditional strategic aid, a prospective Tunisian, Egyptian, or Libyan 
democracy will be something the people in these countries learn and build 
for themselves. A difficult journey has just begun but I cannot see the 
people of these countries and others wanting to turn back. They have 
confronted their fears, risked their lives and reclaimed their dignity. The 
taste for freedom of expression and assembly enjoyed by hundreds of 
thousands of protestors is not easily assuaged. I for one will watch with 
interest to see how these political systems will have to adapt. Given the 
tenor of the last decade, let us just hope that the West starts building 
bridges for all the ditches it has dug.  
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